Apple Public EV Server RSA CA 2 - G1
What is Apple Public EV Server RSA CA 2 - G1?
Apple's own EV TLS for Apple-operated services (iCloud, apple.com properties, iTunes/App Store APIs). Apple mostly issues certificates from its own CA only for Apple-operated hostnames, so seeing this on non-Apple domains is unusual.
Suspicious sites — confidence is not always 100%. Use for Threat Hunting or watchlists.
| Last check (UTC) | First seen (UTC) ▾ | URL | Screenshot | Flags | Details |
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Suspicious sites — confidence is not always 100%. Use for Threat Hunting or watchlists.
| URL | Screenshot | Flags | Details |
|---|
Frequently asked questions about Apple Public EV Server RSA CA 2 - G1
What is Apple Public EV Server RSA CA 2 - G1?
Apple Public EV Server RSA CA 2 - G1 is a publicly trusted intermediate certificate authority operated by Apple Inc. and chained to Apple Root CA - G3. It is recognized by all mainstream browsers and operating system trust stores, so the certificate itself is not a phishing indicator - the same intermediate signs millions of legitimate sites. phishunt only flags the specific domains listed below as suspicious; Apple Public EV Server RSA CA 2 - G1 as a CA is fine.
Is Apple Public EV Server RSA CA 2 - G1 a legitimate certificate authority?
Yes. Apple Public EV Server RSA CA 2 - G1 is a publicly trusted intermediate CA operated by Apple Inc., included in the Microsoft, Apple, Google and Mozilla root trust stores. Every mainstream browser automatically accepts certificates it signs. The intermediate itself is not a phishing signal — what matters is the specific domain. phishunt flags only the suspicious domains listed below; Apple Public EV Server RSA CA 2 - G1 keeps signing millions of legitimate sites.
Who runs the Apple Public EV Server RSA CA 2 - G1 certificate authority?
Apple Public EV Server RSA CA 2 - G1 is operated by Apple Inc.. It is a RSA intermediate that chains up to the Apple Root CA - G3 root, which Apple Inc. also owns. Anyone can look up the chain in the public Certificate Transparency logs; the same operator publishes a Certificate Policy / Certification Practice Statement (CP/CPS) describing how issuance and revocation work.
What does Apple Public EV Server RSA CA 2 - G1 mean when my browser shows it as the issuer?
When a browser shows Apple Public EV Server RSA CA 2 - G1 as the certificate issuer for a site, it means TLS was validated through Apple Inc.'s RSA chain ending at Apple Root CA - G3. That is normal for tens of millions of legitimate sites that use Apple Inc.'s automated DV TLS. The certificate proves the connection is encrypted and that the certificate matches the hostname — it does not prove the site behind it is trustworthy. Always verify the domain name itself.
Why does Apple Public EV Server RSA CA 2 - G1 show up on phishing sites?
Apple Inc. issues RSA domain-validated certificates automatically and at no cost (or very low cost), which is the exact workflow scammers need to put HTTPS on a throwaway domain. Domain validation only proves that the requester controls the domain name, not that the site behind it is trustworthy. phishunt lists the specific domains currently flagged below — those are the suspicious ones, not Apple Public EV Server RSA CA 2 - G1 itself.
How do I verify a certificate issued by Apple Public EV Server RSA CA 2 - G1?
In a desktop browser, click the padlock in the address bar and open the certificate viewer. Confirm the issuer chain ends at Apple Root CA - G3, that the subject matches the domain you expect, and that the notAfter date has not passed. A valid Apple Public EV Server RSA CA 2 - G1 certificate only proves TLS was negotiated correctly — always verify the domain name itself belongs to the service you intended to visit.
What is the difference between Apple Public EV Server RSA CA 2 - G1 and Apple Public Server RSA CA 12 - G1?
Apple Public EV Server RSA CA 2 - G1 and its siblings (Apple Public Server RSA CA 12 - G1) share the same operator (Apple Inc.) and roll up to the same root (Apple Root CA - G3). CAs rotate multiple intermediates so that if one key ever has to be revoked, the damage is contained. As a user, you can treat all of them as the same trust anchor.