WR1

WR1 is a publicly trusted intermediate certificate authority operated by Google Trust Services LLC and chained to GTS Root R1. It is recognized by all mainstream browsers and operating system trust stores, so the certificate itself is not a phishing indicator - the same intermediate signs millions of legitimate sites. phishunt only flags the specific domains listed below as suspicious; WR1 as a CA is fine.

Yes. WR1 is a publicly trusted intermediate CA operated by Google Trust Services LLC, included in the Microsoft, Apple, Google and Mozilla root trust stores. Every mainstream browser automatically accepts certificates it signs. The intermediate itself is not a phishing signal — what matters is the specific domain. phishunt flags only the suspicious domains listed below; WR1 keeps signing millions of legitimate sites.

WR1 is operated by Google Trust Services LLC. It is a RSA intermediate that chains up to the GTS Root R1 root, which Google Trust Services LLC also owns. Anyone can look up the chain in the public Certificate Transparency logs; the same operator publishes a Certificate Policy / Certification Practice Statement (CP/CPS) describing how issuance and revocation work.

When a browser shows WR1 as the certificate issuer for a site, it means TLS was validated through Google Trust Services LLC's RSA chain ending at GTS Root R1. That is normal for tens of millions of legitimate sites that use Google Trust Services LLC's automated DV TLS. The certificate proves the connection is encrypted and that the certificate matches the hostname — it does not prove the site behind it is trustworthy. Always verify the domain name itself.

Google Trust Services LLC issues RSA domain-validated certificates automatically and at no cost (or very low cost), which is the exact workflow scammers need to put HTTPS on a throwaway domain. Domain validation only proves that the requester controls the domain name, not that the site behind it is trustworthy. phishunt lists the specific domains currently flagged below — those are the suspicious ones, not WR1 itself.

In a desktop browser, click the padlock in the address bar and open the certificate viewer. Confirm the issuer chain ends at GTS Root R1, that the subject matches the domain you expect, and that the notAfter date has not passed. A valid WR1 certificate only proves TLS was negotiated correctly — always verify the domain name itself belongs to the service you intended to visit.

WR1 and its siblings (WE1, WE2, WR2, GTS CA 1C3) share the same operator (Google Trust Services LLC) and roll up to the same root (GTS Root R1). CAs rotate multiple intermediates so that if one key ever has to be revoked, the damage is contained. As a user, you can treat all of them as the same trust anchor.